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The Effect of Market Structure on Cellular Technology
Adoption and Pricing1
By Katja Seim and V. Brian Viard*
We examine how structural changes in the mobile telecommunications industry between 1996, when local markets were duopolies,
and 1998, when varying degrees of regulated entry had occurred,
affected firms ' product offerings and nonlinear pricing strategies. We

relate firms' digital technology adoption and the characteristics of
their calling plan menus to the amount of entry in local markets. We
find that entry induces firms to offer larger menus with more evenly

spread plans, both directly and by accelerating the introduction of
digital menus with such features. Prices decline with entry, in particular for high-valuation consumers who benefit from steeper quantity

discounts. (JEL Lil, L13, L96, L98, 033)

carriers offered on average 5.9 different calling plans in a market in
1996. By 2002, that number had increased to 17.5 before falling to 3.7 by
2007. l In part, these changes reflect the introduction, and later elimination, of verti-

cally differentiated services, such as different transmission technologies and sizes
of calling areas. They also reflect adjustments in the carriers' use of second-degree
price discrimination in response to factors such as increasing demand heterogeneity,
increased availability of wireless spectrum, and changes in market structure.
Only a few theoretical results and limited empirical research are available to inform
how market structure affects firms' second-degree price discrimination strategies and
consequent welfare effects. Even less is known about its simultaneous impact on firms'
product offerings and use of price discrimination. This interaction has important welfare
consequences in many empirical settings, particularly communications and information

industries, such as wireless communications, Internet access, and content distribution.
These industries experience frequent market structure changes through reorganizations
or new entry, frequent product innovations due to technological change, and price dis-

crimination based on menus of nonlinear price schedules.

* Seim: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail:
kseim@wharton.upenn.edu); Viard: Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, 20/F, Tower E2, Oriental Plaza, 1
East Chang An Avenue, Beijing, China 100738 (e-mail: brianviardi^ckgsb.edu.cn). We would like to thank Michael
Grubb, John Johnson, and Li Xing for excellent research assistance, Anja Lambrecht, Philip Leslie, John Parapatt,
and Catherine Tucker for helpful comments, and Dan Ackerberg for providing us with computer code for a related
problem. This research was supported by the NET Institute and the Stanford Center for Electronic Business and

Commerce.

tTo comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the article page
at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi= 1 0. 1 257/mic.3.2.22 1 .

1 Authors' calculations based on data from Kagan World Media and MyRatePlan.com, LLC.
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In this paper, we assess the impact of market structure o

tion strategies, both directly, through competitive interac

its influence on how quickly firms market new servi
We employ comprehensive, geographically detailed da
offered by wireless carriers in 1996 and in 1998. Betw

communication services (PCS) providers entered wi

incumbents began introducing digital service that imp

service in call features and spectrum management. In o

relative importance of the direct and the indirect effec

market structure on pricing. We find that the median ind

percent of the overall effects of market structure, reflect

more plan variety and greater price decreases for the n

ogy. We find that indirect effects are less significant in a

along the usage spectrum.

Theoretical work on the direct effect of competi
Oren, Stephen A. Smith, and Robert B. Wilson 1983
F. Spulber 1989; and Lars A. Stole 1995) focuses on the

number of firms and the breadth and curvature of non

mon finding is that greater competition leads firms to
toward marginal cost, increases consumer participation
welfare distortions between high- and low-valuation co

and David P. Myatt (2003, 2006) and Huanxing Yang an

the effect of changes in market structure when firms are

The implications of these papers depend on the initial
firms directly compete or have local monopolies), maki
an empirical setting.

Theoretical work relevant to the indirect effect of mark

uct pricing focuses on the strategic determinants of pro

cally the possibility that a firm would adopt a product pre

adoption by other firms. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1981a
ting effects: lower firm concentration increases the com

vidual firm to gain a relative advantage early, but it al
profits, inducing firms to wait for adoption costs to

Jean Tiróle (1985) imply that, when competition incr
adoption because there are more opportunities for firm

gate, this literature yields inconclusive predictions for the

on the speed of diffusion (see Heidrun C. Hoppe 2002 f
However, we show in the Appendix that by tailoring a
observed in our setting, theoretical predictions are co
finding that entry accelerates adoption when incumb

they remain with an old technology than when they
technology. We argue that the latter condition is likely
as in communications and information industries more

Previous empirical results on the effect of market struct

Sharon G. Levin, Stanford L. Levin, and John B. Meis
and John M. McDowell (1984), and Massoud Karshenas
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respectively, find a negative, positive, and no significant relationship

concentration and adoption speed. A difficulty in this previous wor
for unobserved drivers of both entry and product introduction strat
that occurred in wireless markets after 1996 resulted from regulator

which limits the role of unobserved profit shifters in determining mark

addition, the levels of entry experienced by 1998 varied across local
of exogenous differences in geographic and regulatory features that

required to build a sufficiently dense transmission network. Our emp

a positive relationship between market concentration and adoption spe

from a more controlled setting than was possible in previous work.

We find that additional competition leads to increased price discrim
directly, through increased plan variety, and indirectly, through q
and marketing of the new service, and that both effects are import
with more competition, firms are more likely to upgrade and, if th
more analog calling plans and introduce more digital calling plans t
terparts in less competitive markets. We show further that firms ge
the clustering of contracts more in markets with more entry, sugg
respond to intensified competition by attempting to steal business
increasing customer segmentation.

We also find that competition induces firms to tailor their offerings t

group whose demand is best served by their chosen technology. Incum
tinue to offer capacity-constrained analog service expand their sha

plans more when facing more competitors. Digital entrants and incum

replaced analog with capacity-unconstrained digital service increase th

usage plans more when facing more entry. High-usage customers also

price decreases due to entry. Consistent with evidence provided by
and Marc Rysman (2005), we find that while firms reduce prices in g

discounts are larger in markets with more entry. Competition again play

with entry decreasing price, and an indirect role, with firms that offer
offering steeper discounts than their non-digital competitors.

These results have important consequences for telecommunication

In most countries regulators have a direct impact on market structure th

ing practices, spectrum allocation or auctions, and merger reviews. I
important for regulators to consider the impact of alternative mark
the improvement of existing technological standards and subsequen

example, in deciding how much spectrum to make available for
band services, regulators should consider the incentives that ensuin
will create for incumbents to phase out narrowband or upgrade exis
technologies and the menu of prices they offer. Similarly, the ong
tion in the wireless industry may benefit consumers through impro
and coverage and cost savings generated by scale economies. Howev
suggest that increased concentration may also slow efforts to introd
ation services and alter providers' pricing, with high- valuation cust
most severely affected. Our results complement theoretical work em
regulators consider the role of substitutes in pressuring incumbents
offerings (see Michael H. Riordan 1992).
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Figure 1 . Major Trading Areas and Cellular Market Areas

Notes: This map shows the geographic market areas for cellular service. The dark-bordered regions are the 5 1 M
and the light-bordered areas are the CM As. Shaded CM As denote the set of 100 largest cellular markets in 1996.

I. Mobile Telecommunications Markets in the Late 1990s

The US cellular phone industry originated in 1981, when the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) awarded two licenses per cellular market are
(CMA) to provide cellular telephone services in 306 metropolitan markets and 42
FCC-designated rural markets covering the entire country (see Figure 1). The du
poly structure existed until the introduction of PCS.2 Between December 1994 a

January 1997, the FCC awarded 2,074 PCS spectrum licenses, six in each mar

ket. The geographic market definition used for PCS spectrum differed from that f

cellular markets. Fifty-one major trading areas (MTAs), shown inside bold-faced
boundaries in Figure 1, divided the country into regions the size of multiple citie

or states, which were subdivided into basic trading areas (BTAs) the same size as
or slightly larger than the corresponding CMA. We utilize two snapshots of the un

verse of residential wireless contracts from the 100 largest CM As (shown as shad
areas in Figure 1) provided by Kagan World Media to investigate how market co
duct changed with entry. The first snapshot was taken in February 1996, when all but

two markets operated as duopolies,3 and the second in March 1998.
Concurrent with the allocation of PCS licenses, Nextel Communications entere

by transitioning from providing mobile radio services to offering wireless service
Nextel began a national rollout of its service in September 1996. By 1998, Nexte
had entered 71 of the 100 largest cellular markets. Despite Nextel's initial focus on

2 Cellular pricing under this duopoly structure is the topic of Philip M. Parker and Lars-Hendrik Roller (199

and Busse (2000).

^The two exceptions are the Baltimore and Washington CM As, which we dropped from the estimation samp
Both markets experienced entry by three firms by 1998.
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business customers, we treat it as a viable competitor to the cellu
similar to the PCS entrants.

With the conclusion of the PCS auctions, cellular incumbents faced potential
entry of one specialized mobile operator and six PCS providers. Two main factors
drive the number of competitors actually operating in a market by 1998. First, due to

the bankruptcy of several winning bidders in small business auctions, 347 licenses
remained initially inactive and were re-auctioned only in April 1999. Second, there
is a significant lag between license award and service initiation while the carrier
builds a network of towers to broadcast signals of sufficient quality to its users'

phones.4 This time lag is commonly referred to as the "build-out" delay. Since
Nextel's network is cellular-like, similar build-out requirements constrained its roll-

out of service. The time it takes to deploy service depends on endogenous market
characteristics such as the potential subscriber base. Other characteristics, such as
the market's geographic area and local land-use regulations that affect the difficulty
and cost of constructing the required tower network, provide exogenous variation in
the number of competitors across markets at a given time.
Table 1 shows the entrants' launch dates by quarter for the largest 100 markets
from 1995 to 1998. By March 1998, on average 4.31 providers offer wireless service
in a CMA. Across markets, five cities had no entry, 25 cities entry by one firm, 27
cities entry by two firms, 33 cities entry by three firms, and ten cities entry by four

firms by 1998.

The networks that the entrants built used digital technologies. Digital technologies improved the efficiency of spectrum use and the quality and reliability of service. By allowing for new features such as call waiting and caller ID, they increased
vertical differentiation in service provision. Prior to the introduction of digital technology, vertical differentiation was primarily due to differences in call quality in the

local calling area. The only significant horizontal differentiation was brand reputation unrelated to vertical quality.

As of 1998, digital service had a limited coverage area, which was frequently
restricted to the user's local calling area since the providers' use of four incompatible
technology standards increased the chance of inoperability when traveling.5 Initially,
therefore, analog service continued to be attractive to low-usage customers or customers who traveled frequently outside their local region. With the increased diffusion of

digital technologies, however, demand for digital service quickly exceeded that for

analog, with approximately 50 percent of subscribers using digital technologies by
late 1999 (Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association 2000).
In 1996 the incumbents employed analog technology almost exclusively, and in
rare cases immature digital technologies, and could choose to upgrade their existing
analog networks to digital. Adding digital capabilities to an existing network usually
involved minimal hardware additions at the towers along with software upgrades and
a significant amount of system optimization. Frequently, incumbents did not require

4 The FCC required PCS licensees to meet specific coverage requirements, amounting to providing adequate
service to between 25 and 33 percent of the market's population within five years.

5 The cellular and PCS providers used one of three digital technology standards, CDMA, TDM A, or GSM.
Nextel used Motorola's digital iDEN technology.
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Table 1 - Entrants' Activation of Systems by Launch Quarter in
Markets, Q4 1995-Q2 1998

Quarter of Number of Average build-out time Average

launch launches (months) market size

Q4-1995 2 ¡TO 3,538,229

Ql-1996
Q2-1996 2 13.0
Q3-1996 13 16.6
Q4-1996 39 20.2
Ql-1997 35 23.4
Q2-1997 28 26.0
Q3-1997 31 28.2
Q4-1997 34 30.0
Ql-1998 12 33.1
Q2-1998 22 26.8

1,062,081
1,553,067
2,031,327
1,884,427
2,205,694
2,269,856
1,746,194
2,062,024
1,900,680

Total

1,951,804
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an
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are
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various

towers

issues,

c

to

prov

difficulties

assoc

faced.

to

system

Cellular

changes
adoption

in

incumb

deman

decision

f

Incumbents' timing of and
By 1998, 66.32 percent of al
percent offered only digital
ers a choice between analog
both; 33.68 percent of provid
During the sample period m
number of markets. Of the
fifteen firms operated in at
carriers offered service in m
other providers to terminate
offered only local calling pla
The calling plans consist of
ing we define a "plan family
fer in their fixed fees and n
have a common service tech
and contract duration. Since

6 See Jason Meyers (1997) for a more
7 The FCC's rules require that all incum
However, the carriers are not required
phony carriers such as the PCS provide
8 With the gradual build-out of larger n
calling areas subsequent to our sample p
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provider in our data offers one digital "plan family" in a local m

lular provider that has introduced digital service but continue
service offers a choice of two "plan families."
Table 2 shows that a plan family offered by the incumbents i
on average, 5.89 individual analog plans; the number of plans of
ranged from three to eight. By 1998, incumbents had introdu
families across the 98 markets, while continuing to offer 178
Relative to 1996, the number of plans in an analog plan family
on average; however, the standard deviation of 1.92 plans reflec
ment. A large fraction of providers offered both analog and dig
ously, with their digital calling plan families consisting of 5.0
Table 2 also shows the variation in fixed fees and allowances ac
This variation, together with the variation in entry and the clear

kets in this industry, yields an attractive setting in which to test t

structure on technology adoption timing and price discriminatio

II. Entry, Technology Adoption, and Nonlinear Pricing: R

Greater competition in cellular markets has the potential to
linear pricing practices through two channels. With more com
adjust both the number of options offered to customers in thei
the placement of their plans. These are the direct effects of entr
additional competition may change incumbents' incentives to ad
nology, leading them to make changes to the offered pricing m

families differ from analog. These are the indirect effects of entry

We begin with a discussion of the effects of entry on plan in
turning to an analysis of plan placement, investigating changes
and for customers of different usage types. We then quantify

price levels. As we discuss our results, we relate them to the a
predictions.
A. Effect on Plan Introductions
We first consider incumbents' incentives to introduce additional plans in response to
entry. We use the change between 1996 and 1998 in the number of calling plans incumbents offer to test whether they respond to changes in competition, either directly, by
changing the size of plan families, or indirectly, by complementing or replacing existing analog with digital offerings. We find that incumbents were more likely to increase

calling plan variety for new or continuing technologies and to phase out additional
calling plans for obsolete technologies in markets with more competitors.

9The data include detailed calling plan descriptors, which confirm that changes in the menu of plans reflect the
introduction or elimination of distinct calling plans. We focus on two key features of cellular contracts, the plan's
monthly fixed fee and allowance. Along these two dimensions, the plan offerings differ significantly within each
plan family.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics, 98 Largest Cellular Markets
Obser-

Variable

vations

Incumbents

Mean

'plan

SD

Minimum

family

Maximum

characteristics

Number of plans in analog family, 1996 193 5.89 1 .30 3.00 8.00
Change in the number of plans offered, 1996-1998 193 2.80 3.47 -5.00 12.00
Analog plan families, if offered 178 -0.07 1.92 -6.00 5.00
Digital plan families, if offered 128 5.06 1.58 2.00 9.00
Share, analog plan families, 1998 306 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Incumbents' plan characteristics, 1998

Fixed fee,
Allowance,
Fixed fee,
Allowance,

analog plans 1,017 72.06 64.87 9.95 592.99
analog plans 1,017 301.05 470.98 0.00 3,560.00
digital plans 713 73.24 47.96 14.95 279.99
digital plans 713 555.74 558.04 0.00 3,000.00

Incumbents' technology choice by market, 1998

Analog only (provider share)1 193 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Digital only (provider share)1 193 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Mixed technology (provider share)1 193 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00

incumbent characteristics

Number of markets present 24 12.75 15.59 1.00 48.00

Small network (provider share) 24 0.63 0.49 0.00 1.00
Large network (provider share) 24 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Market characteristics

Population (000) 98 1,524.66 1,662.93 175.20 9,519.34
Average commuting time (mins) 98 24.58 3.25 19.00 38.90
Household income (000) 98 44.03 7.18 31.05 74.34
Percent with BA or more 98 24.41 5.43 13.09 41.66

Heterogeneity in commuting time 98 87.57 1.06 84.58 89.98
Heterogeneity in income 98 92.46 0.23 91.68 93.09
Heterogeneity in educational attainment 98 83.97 1.82 77.14 86.80

Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index 98 0.05 0.74 - 1 .28 1 .89
Percentage of MSA area classified commercial 98 2.95 3.23 0.31 22.97

1 The unit of observation is the market and provider, measuring the percent of firms that offer a g
in the market.

Econometric Model - We estimate a system of three nonlinear equa
full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which predicts the cho
ment in the size of the plan family and technology adoption while con
correlations in unobserved market attributes that render entry endogen
mation accounts for the discreteness of our data. We specify the change in

plans between 1996 and 1998, which ranges from -6 to 9 in the data, f

i in market m offering technology t G {analogy digital} as an ordered p

-6 xf [</, p лЬ] + ib < cu

(l)APlansimt = i I if Cf < f[af,lf,Zb] + CL < Q+i> *

9 ifCp9<f[ap,/f,ZL] +tìL
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where the parameter Cp implies a cutoff for the unobservable f^mt

ing from a change in plans of / - 1 to /.10 We allow the number of

ibly affect the change in the number of plans by estimating an effect t

technology and plan type, controlling for market characteristics:

(2) /V,/?'ZL] = oř + ß'Prov_Techim + ßP2Plan_Typeim

+ ßP3(Prov_Techim)(Plan_Typeim)(Entrantsm) + ßi

Prov_Techim = [Prov_Analogim Prov_Mixedim Prov_Digitalim] are
indicating whether firm i offers analog-only, mixed, or digital-onl

1998, Plan_Typeim = [Plans _Analogim Plans _Digitalim] are dumm
cating whether firm /'s plan family is analog or digital, and Entrantsm

of PCS entrants by 1998.
We follow earlier studies of the cellular industry, such as Busse (2

J. Miravete and Roller (2004), to control for market demographics t

choices of plan variety and include these in Xfm. These include the

(Popm) as a measure of market size, mean commuting time in minut
as a proxy for the additional value of a cellular phone to frequent

household income (Income m), and the educational attainment of th

old (BA + m). Since plan variety reflects primarily demand hetero
than size, we compute Herfindahl-type indices for the demograph
each market, representing the probability of two randomly selected
falling into the same demographic category.11 Table 2 provides de
tics for the variables and Table 3 summarizes the variables and their sources. We
also include firm fixed-effects in Xfm to control for firm-specific differences in the
response to entry.

We specify firm /'s decision to adopt digital technology as a probit model:

(3) Digital* = '

[0 otherwise,

controlling for firm and market factors that might affect adoption:

(4) fD[aD,ßD,Zfm) = aD + ßD,Entrantsm + ß%BA + m + ß%Commutem
+ ßD,Popm + ßDblncomem + ß%LargeSci + ß?SmallSc,
10 An alternative specification would be a count-data model. In our setting, the ordered response model has the
benefit that it naturally allows for negative values of the outcome variable. See Colin A. Cameron and Pravin K.
Trivedi (2005) for a discussion of the advantages of discrete choice models when modeling changes in counts, and
Cameron and Trivedi (1986) for a comparison of the performance of ordered and count-data estimators. A downside
to the ordered probit model is that extrapolation beyond the observed maximum change in plans offered is difficult.
We focus on interpreting the effects of changes in the estimated parameters within the observed sample range of
the plan change variable only.
1 ' The incumbents' choices to introduce calling plans may reflect growth or increasing heterogeneity in market
demand. Unfortunately, market-specific changes in the cellular subscriber base are not available.
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Table 3 - Variable Description and Data Sources

Variable

APlans

Description

Change
by

in

Data

the

incumbents

source

number

in

each

of

plans

market.

Plan-Family Herfindahl1 Herfindahl
calling plan.
Share of high-usage plans Number of calling plans with an allowance above 1 80 minutes

index

ba

as a share of family's total number of plans.

Prov_Analog Indicator: Provider offers only analog service in 1998.
Prov_Mixed Indicator: Provider offers separate analog and digital plan
choices in 1998.

Prov_Digital Indicator: Provider offers only digital service in 1998.
Plans_Analog Indicator: Plan family's technology is analog.
Plans_Digital Indicator: Plan family's technology is digital.
Entrants Number of entrants into the market by 1998.
LargeSc Indicator: Provider offers cellular service in more than 15 of
the top 100 cellular markets.

SmallSc Indicator: Provider offers cellular service in at most 5 of the
top 100 cellular markets.

Pop CMA population in thousands. Census 2000
Area CMA land area in square miles.
Commute Average commuting time in minutes.
Income Household income in thousands of dollars.

BA + Percent of MSA population with at least a BA degree.
Heterogeneity, time2 Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of workers by
commuting time. Categories begin at 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35,
40, 45, 60, and 90 minutes.

Heterogeneity, income2 Heterogeneity index. Groups classify household shares by income in thousands, beginning at $10 to $50 in $5 increments,

$60, $75, $100, $125, $150, and $200.

Heterogeneity, educational Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of population

attainment2 above 25 years. Categories are less than 9th grade; 9th-12th
grade; high school graduate but no BA; BA or higher.

%Comm Percent of CMA area with commercial establishment density Spatial Insights, Inc.
of 70 or more per square kilometer (75th percentile in data)!

WRI Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index developed Saiz (2010)
in Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz, and Anita Summers (2008).

'The Herfindahl index is defined as Y,j=l j ((#/ - Ф-О/^у)2» where qj denotes the allowance on tariff у

and #o = 0 < tfi <•<<?./•

2 The heterogeneity indexes for commuting time, household income, and educational attainment are defined as

1 - £ ¡(share of groupt)2.

Digital im equals one if firm i adopted digital technology in the market by 1998.
LargeSc and SmallSc indicate whether the firm operates a large or small network
defined as more than fifteen and fewer than six markets, respectively. We also
include provider fixed-effects, ßf isolates the effect of entry on the incumbents'
adoption choices.
Identifying the causal effect of entry on pricing and adoption is difficult since all

three potentially reflect the attractiveness of a market in difficult-to-measure ways.

If firms choose to build out less competitive markets first, this is likely similarly
reflected in incumbents' pricing strategies or the attractiveness of implementing
digital technology. For example, in markets with higher demand growth for cellular
telephone usage we might expect faster entry and a greater chance of incumbents'
upgrading to the digital technology, which allows for greater network capacity. This
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could introduce a spurious correlation between entry and adopt
does not represent a causal effect.12

We control for the possibility of endogenous entry in two w
sider changes in the number of plans between 1996 and 1998, w
market-specific unobservable determinants of the incumbents'
that are time-constant. Second, we instrument for the number o

iliary model using measures of geography and land-use regulat
build-out delay across markets, but are uncorrelated with the in
and pricing decisions.
We specify the number of entrants, which ranges from 0 to
ordered probit model:

'О iff[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm < CE

(5) Entrantsm = i j if Cf < fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm <
^4 ifCf <fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] + eEm9

where the parameter Cf implies a cutoff for the unobservable e
j entrants and:

(6) fE[aE,ßE,ZEm] = aE + ßEPopm + ßEPop2m + ß
+ ßEWRIm + ßE%Commm.

The market's potential subscriber base (Popm) has an ambiguou
A larger potential market attracts entry, while making it more

build-out requirements. We include the market area (Aream) an
local land use and its regulation to capture the difficulty of buil
local municipal land-use office must approve new cell towers pri
tion. Many local ordinances prohibit towers in residential zone
industrial and commercial zones. Therefore, the stringency of
directly affects the availability of appropriate tower sites in loc
cost and difficulty for a new entrant to build out a market. At
zoning laws should be uncorrelated with demand for cellular ser
bents' digital technology adoption decisions since incumbents u
ing already existing towers, rather than having to site new towe
Our first land-use measure is the 2005 Wharton Residential Ur

Index (WRIm) created by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). T
vey-based, standardized measure of the stringency of resident

policies. We follow Saiz (2010) in aggregating the original m

12 While we also control for a possible spurious correlation between entry and plan v
theoretical mechanism underlying such correlation is less clear. The effect of market gro
or their features is unaddressed in the theoretical literature, in which plan variety is determ
of horizontal or vertical preferences or both but not by consumer density.
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the CMA level. CMAs with high WRI values have zoning

approval practices that limit new residential real estate deve

ing in greater availability of candidate cell tower sites outs
dential areas. This should ease market entry.
CMA-level commercial zoning data are unavailable. Instea

from Spatial Insights, Inc. on the number of establishmen

group to compute the share of a CMA's block groups that ar
commercial, or industrial use and therefore available as pot

be conservative, we classify a block group as commercial if

ments exceeds the 75th percentile in the data (70 establishm

ter). The variable %Commm measures the percent of the to

commercial block groups. Higher values of %Commm sh
easier market build-out and therefore entry.

Single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered
number of entrants as a function of the explanatory variabl
that entry is associated positively and significantly with bot
The excluded instruments that affect neither the plan chan
sion are also jointly significant in explaining entry. For th

partial F-statistic for the hypothesis that the instruments do n

tion is 15.35, while the x2-statistic for the same hypothes
model is 44.46.

We assume that the plan change and adoption decision error terms can be decomposed into a market and a firm-(technology-)specific component with (£mt = epm +

Vto and & = eDm + r,?m where r¡pmt ~ N(0,1) and г£~Щ091). Normalizing the
variance of е„ to one, we allow for a flexible correlation structure between marketlevel errors:

/eDm' I i 0' loi aDP aDE'^

(7) 'epm ~ N 0 1, aDP a' aPE .
'em/ ' ' 0/ 'VdE °PE 1 / /
eEm, e^ and epm are unobservable, market-specific factors that affect the entry, adop-

tion, and plan change decisions, respectively, of all firms. The covariance terms
allow for the kinds of correlations in the market-level unobservables discussed

above. The Appendix contains details of the estimation approach.
Direct Effects. - The left panel of Table 4 shows the results of estimating the
system-of-equations FIML specification for equations (1), (3), and (5). Entry has a
significant effect on the change in the number of plans offered by both analog-only
and mixed-technology providers. Mixed-technology incumbents introduce more
digital plans and phase out more analog plans in markets with more entrants and

13 The estimates under these two specifications are similar to those in Table 4.
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Table A - Change in Number of Plans and Digital Technology Adoption by Cellular Incumbents,
1996-1998
FIML

OLS

Standard Marginal Standard

Coefficient error effect Coefficient error

Plan change equation
Providers' Type of Technology, 1998

Prov.Analog -0.733** 0.363 -1.066 -1.422 1.097
Prov.Mixed

0.025

0.331

0.037

0.113

1.020

Plans_Digital 2.205** 0.240 3.208 3.016** 0.362
Market Characteristics

Prov_Analog x Entrants 0.126* 0.096 0.184 0.498** 0.222
Prov_Digital x Entrants 0.037 0.143 0.054 0.268 0.429
Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Entrants -0.294** 0.098 -0.427 -0.442** 0.200
Prov.Mixed x Plans_Digital x Entrants 0.293** 0.061 0.426 0.484** 0.083
Population 3.5E-5 0.003 5.1E-5 0.004 0.010
Heterogeneity, Commuting Time -0.052** 0.004 -0.075 -0.104 0.164
Heterogeneity, Household Income -0.468** 0.003 -0.680 -0.720** 0.323
Heterogeneity, Educational Attainment -0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.015 0.068
Digital adoption decision equation
Market characteristics
Entrants

0.566**

%withBA

-0.039**

0.207

0.020

0.108

0.096*

-0.007

0.052

-0.008

0.010

Commuting time 0.019 0.026 0.004 0.006 0.016
Population 0.038** 0.022 0.007 0.004** 0.002

Household income 0.033** 0.017 0.006 0.011** 0.005
Provider characteristics

Large potential network 2.818** 0.496 0.538 0.190** 0.037
Small potential network 2.065** 0.357 0.394 -0.263** 0.104

Adjusted R2 (plan change, adoption) (0.739, 0.388)

n (plan change, adoption) 306 (306, 1 93)
Log-likelihood (FIML) -757.643

Notes: Provider fixed effects included in plan change and digital adoption decision equation
tered at the provider level based on 50 bootstrapped samples for FIML estimates. For the FI
estimated coefficients of the entry equation with the corresponding standard errors in paren

ENTRANTS =0.137 POP -0.001 POP2 +0.055 AREA +0.087 %COMM + 0.357
(0.0210) (0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0196) (0.0987)

with estimated covariances {o-DE,(TEp,crDp} and variances {cr2D,ap}
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.

both effects are highly significant. These incumbe
and remove 0.43 analog plans for each additional ent
is complementary to work by Ron Borzekowski, R
Taragin (2009) who find that direct-mail-marketin
of distinctly-priced selection criteria, and thus pr
markets with more competitors. Incumbents who
ogy introduce 0.18 additional plans for each additio
economically significant given means of 5.89 plans
The effect of entry on digital-only incumbents is p
because there are only fifteen observations to iden
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covariates, a one standard deviation increase decreases
market by 0.08 plans for commuting time and by 0.16

The system of equations is identified without instrum
earities of the ordered probit equation for entry. Since

from the functional form assumptions for the errors, we a

displayed in the right panel of Table 4. The three significan

are mostly in line with the corresponding marginal effects

additional entrant in a market is associated with a decre

an increase of 0.48 digital plans for a mixed-technolog
mates imply that analog-only incumbents introduce 0.
entrant, while the results for digital-technology provid
the demand heterogeneity variables, only income hete
negative effect on the change in the number of calling p

Indirect Effects. - Entry also has a significant indirec

schedules by increasing the likelihood that an incumben

tal technology, thereby causing it to reduce the size of
family while introducing a larger family of digital plan

4 display the FIML and OLS results for the adoption

affects adoption, with each additional entrant increasing

by 10.80 and 9.59 percentage points in the FIML and O
The FIML results indicate a U-shaped effect of firm
with large- and small-scope firms being more likely to
firms. Large-scope firms may benefit from cost savings
doing or quantity discounts in equipment purchases. Sm

likely to attract consumers who travel less, are less affecte

ferent digital technologies outside their locale, and ther
side incentives to adopt earlier. Adoption is higher in m
less highly educated markets.

Comparing Direct and Indirect Effects. - Using the F

pare the relative importance of the direct and indirect effe

no new entrants to having an average level of entry (2.16 f

induces mixed-technology incumbents to phase out an
introduce an additional 0.92 digital plans. The incumbe
the digital technology also increases by 16.35 percentag
that transition from analog-only to mixed provider in
plans and an additional 1.10 analog plans. Therefore, in
rectly causes a firm to introduce an additional 0.53 dig
This represents a substantial indirect effect on marketi
highlights the role of technology choice as a second ave
structure affects firms' nonlinear pricing strategies.

14 A similar calculation for transition to a digital-only provider yields a d
indirect effect of 0.52 plan introductions.
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Our technology adoption results are of independent interest as

with theoretical predictions. In the Appendix, we consider a mod

nology adoption in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiróle (1986). A
entry by PCS firms, the cellular incumbent chooses the optima
digital service, which we model as a product innovation. In con
and Tiróle (1986), we focus on entrants who have pre-committe
nology, eliminating a strategic deterrence motive in the incum
model predicts that the incumbent's adoption timing hinges on
its post-entry profits to its decision. If increased competition fr
dramatically reduces the incumbent's profits from the old tech
those from the new, it is more likely to adopt before entry oc
results thus suggest that the onset of PCS competition has a great
incumbents' profits from analog service than on those from dig
is probably because of the fast consumer uptake of digital serv
and is likely the case in information and communications servi
broadly. In these industries, revenues from new technologies ten
take those from old, and the price of old technologies is more se
competition than the price of new.
These results are also consistent with those of Barton H. Hamilton and Brian

McManus (2005) that firms in competitive markets are more likely to have adopted
a new technology earlier than those in monopoly markets. Together our papers provide a complementary picture of the role of technology adoption in firm behavior.
While we focus on how technology adoption affects adopters' pricing, their work
focuses on how it affects adopters' market shares and ability to deter entry.15

B. Effect on Plan Placement
Our results so far demonstrate that entry led to finer price discrimination as mea-

sured by plan family size. Since the size on its own does not provide information
about which types of consumers are targeted with different plans, we now test the
effect of entry on calling plan placement across the usage spectrum. We find that, with

more entry, firms spread their plans more evenly over the usage spectrum for most
plan types. This is consistent with business-stealing overpowering the firm's incentive

to differentiate under increased competition. This result reinforces the plan change
results by confirming that they are not due to counting very similar plans as distinct.

To measure plan placement and clustering, we use a Herfindahl index based on
the share of minutes "allocated" to each plan, which, once normalized, is comparable across plan families. While it would be useful to compare the plan variety
observed in our data with that predicted by theory, this is not possible given the
current theoretical literature. Instead, we rely on this descriptive measure of plan
placement across markets in the same industry so that we can relate it to market

15Hannan and McDowell (1984), Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Sharon Oster (1982), and Nancy L. Rose

and Paul L. Joskow (1990) investigate the effect of firm characteristics on adoption speed. Apart from firms' geographic scope, we cannot examine this question because firms' subscriber bases, revenues, and network sizes by

market are unavailable.
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structure while controlling for the possibility that plac
erogeneous consumer preferences across markets.

We assume that the total allocable minutes within a p
est allowance on any plan within the family.16 We def
plan as the difference between the plan's allowance an

ance in the plan family (or zero for the first plan). F
includes two plans with allowances of 300 and 500 min

is ((500 - 300)/500)2 + ((300 - 0)/500)2 = 13/25.
plans, the Herfindahl index ranges from a value of '/n
to a value of 1 if all plans are identical.

To make the Herfindahl index comparable across

lies, we normalize it by dividing by the Herfindahl th
ing of plans (l/n). In our example above, the norma
(1/2) = (26/25) . For a plan family with n plans, the n
from one, if all plans are equally spaced, to n, if all plan
of Table 5 provides summary statistics, using both ent
offerings, which increases the number of observations

Econometric Model - We use a setup similar to the p
ify the firms' choices of plan placement as:

(8) NormHHIimt = aH + ß?Prov_Techim + ß%Plan_

+ ß^ProvSechim){Planjrypeim)(Entrants
+ ß>4 X/m + £/mř

■= fH'aH вн Z?l + £?
where NormHHIimt is the normalized Herfindahl index of plan placement in 1998.
We employ levels instead of heterogeneity measures for the demographic variables
to capture how overall demand affects firms' choices of plan spacing. We again estimate the system of equations (3), (5), and (8) using FIML, accounting for the simultaneous choice of technology adoption and market entry. The Appendix describes
the adjustments made to the estimation procedure to reflect the continuous nature of
the normalized Herfindahl measure that replaces the discrete plan change variable.17

Direct and Indirect Effects. - Competition has a significant and negative direct
effect on the normalized Herfindahl index for the majority of plan family types. These
16 As a robustness check, we replicate our results using as a measure of allocable minutes the number of minutes
for which a particular plan represents the cost-minimizing option in the plan family. The disadvantage of this measure relative to the allowance-based measure is that it requires an assumption about consumers' maximum usage.
To check the sensitivity of the results to this assumption, we estimate assuming a maximum usage of either 1,000
or 2,000 minutes. The results are similar to those in Table 6 in both magnitude and significance of the coefficients
regardless of the assumption of maximum usage.

17 We do not include entrants' choice of technology in estimating equation (3) since entrants pre-commit to the
digital technology.
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Table 5 - Summary Statistics, Allowance-Based Plan Placement Measures, Incumbents' and
Entrants' 1998 Plans
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations

Full menu of plans

Herfindahl, families with 5-7 plans 0.358 0.108 0.193 0.789 335
Normalized Herfindahl, all plan
families

1.936

0.708

1.000

5.868

521

"High-usage " and "low-usage
Share of plans above median,

"

plans

all plan families 0.553 0.214 0.000 1.000 521

Normalized Herfindahl above

median, all plan families 1.325 0.390 1.000 3.021 504

Normalized Herfindahl below

median, all plan families 1.709 0.536 1.000 5.149 488

results, shown in the left-hand columns of Table 6, are al

As a share of the mean across all plan families, an addit
the normalized Herfindahl by 9.40 percent for analog-o
for digital-only, and 4.83 percent for analog plans offe
providers. The one exception is digital offerings by mix

which become more clustered in response to addition

tional competitor increases the normalized Herfindahl b
increased competition leads firms to spread plans mo
spectrum, increasing plan variety.
The indirect effect of competition leads firms to increa
types. For a given number of entrants, the digital plan f
digital-only providers exhibit less clustering than the an
by raising the probability of digital adoption, additional c
offering greater plan variety. For providers that transition

ing both technologies, the normalized Herfindahl ind

percent of the mean) for analog plan families and by 2.

mean) for digital. For these plan family types, the indirect e

effects. For a provider that transitions to digital-only of

normalized Herfindahl is 1.31 (67.84 percent of the mea
effects of competition.

Evaluated at the mean level of entry, the direct effects
nitude than the indirect effects for both mixed and digit
providers, the average increase in the number of compet

tion of 0.20 in the normalized Herfindahl index for analo
increase of 0.24 for digital plan families. Accounting fo
of digital adoption at the mean level of entry, indirect ef
log plan families and a decrease of 0.07 in the normalize

families. A similar calculation for transition to a digital-o
effect of -0.25 and an expected indirect effect of -0.04.

Robustness. - To test the robustness of our results to th

we re-estimate using the non-normalized Herfindahl inde
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Table 6 - Placement of Incumbents' and Entrants' 1998 Pricing Plans Based on Allowance Levels:
FIML Estimation

Normalized Herfindahl all 1998 Herfindahl, 1998 plan families

plan families with 5-7 plans

Standard Standard

Coefficient error Coefficient error

Provider and plan characteristics

Prov_Analog -0.732** 0.2627 0.086* 0.0661

Prov_Mixed -0.978** 0.2154 -0.131** 0.0516

Plans_Digital -1.313** 0.1715 -0.014 0.0365
Entrant_YN

Market

0.355**

structures

0.1456

0.034

0.0340

(IT)

Prov.Analog x Competitors -0.182** 0.0687 -0.043** 0.0207
Prov_Digital x Competitors -0.117** 0.0519 -0.012 0.0161
Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Competitors -0.093** 0.0568 0.013 0.0184
Prov_Mixed x Plans_Digital x Competitors 0.113** 0.0544 0.008 0.0174
Market characteristics

%withBA

-0.023

0.0239

-0.007*

0.0052

Commuting time -0.328** 0.0796 -0.013 0.0127
Population 0.010** 0.0020 0.001* 0r0005
Household income -0.042 0.0588 -0.050** 0.0155

SD,rferf 0.551** 0.0211 0.085** 0.0042
Log-likelihood

-664.68

Observations

521

178.71
335

Notes:
Provider
fixed-effects
i
tered
standard
errors
based
on
with
the
corresponding
bootstr

ENTRANTS

=

0.

158

(0.0215) (0.0002) (0.0619) (0.0375) (0.1063)

POP

-

ADOPTION = 0. 157 ENTRANTS - 0.033 BAPLUS + 0.029 COMMUTE + 0.048 POP
(0.1031) (0.0219) (0.0285) (0.0163)

+ 0.046 INCOME + 2.607 LARGE-SC + 1 .
(0.0198) (0.3120) (0.2455)

and for Specification II:

ENTRANTS = 0. 1 13 POP - 0.001 POP2 + 0.068 AREA
(0.0344) (0.0003) (0.0956) (0.0696) (0.1365)

ADOPTION = 0.258 ENTRANTS - 0.017 BAPLUS + 0.001 COMMUTE + 0.056 POP
(0.2359) (0.0465) (0.0630) (0.0304)

+ 0.042 INCOME + 1.529 LARGE-SC +1.361
(0.0388) (0.6143) (0.5707)

The variables in the entrant equation are defined in
{0.003, 0.055, 0.001} and {-0.002, 0.105, -0.133} and th
{0.249, 0. 153} for Specifications I and II, respectively.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
♦Significant at the 10 percent level.

to plan families with five to seven plans. T

335. Summary statistics are in the top pan
the right-hand columns of Table 6. The res

offerings are directionally consistent with
as significant perhaps due to the reduced n
ple, the average Herfindahl in markets w

spaced plans. The average level of entry

VOL 3 NO. 2 SEIM AND VIARD: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE 239

families. The results in mixed-technology offerings and for digital-

not significant, possibly because the majority of the lost observatio

С Heterogeneous Effects on Consumers

Thus far we have found that entry increases the number of pl
incumbent firms and typically spreads these plans more evenly a
spectrum. We now test whether an increase in competition has a d
on high- versus low- valuation consumers. We find that firms res
competition by increasing the number of plans targeted at custo
technologies best serve.
To test the relative effect on high- valuation consumers, we clas
into high- and low-usage. We designate a calling plan as "high-us
ance is greater than 180, the median allowance across all plans in
again include both entrants and incumbents to increase the numbe
and focus on levels since all entrants had zero plans in 1996. Summ

three measures of plan mix (share of high-usage plans offered an
Herfindahl indices among high-usage or low-usage plans) are disp
tom panel of Table 5. As in our other models, we specify the firm
mix as a function of the provider's technology type, the plan fam

and entry effects that vary by provider type and technology, and mar

ics. We use FIML to jointly estimate the determinants of the plan m

the determinants of adoption (equation 3) and of aggregate entry

Relative Prevalence of High-Usage Plans. - Our primary meas

of high-usage plans in a plan family. We find that the share of h

increases significantly with the number of competitors for digital-onl

decreases for mixed-technology providers. The results are shown

columns of Table 7. The average share of high-usage plans is 5

additional competitor increases the share by 1.75 for digital-only
includes both new PCS entrants and incumbents who fully replac

digital offerings. This is a large effect given that the number of c
from two to six. For mixed-technology providers, the share is red
analog offerings and 3.42 for digital offerings.

These results suggest that increased competition induces fi
discrimination differentially depending on their technology

Incumbents and new entrants who use digital transmission techno

exploit the benefits of their increased network capacity by targeti
users. Providers that continue to offer at least some service on the more-constrained

analog technology instead respond to more entry by increasing their share of plans
targeted at low-valuation customers. Competition thus results in firms tailoring
18 To ensure that our results are not sensitive to our specific choice of clustering measure, we re-estimated using

a modified L-function index developed by Eric Marcon and Florence Puech (2003) for use in measuring industry
agglomeration. We adapted the L-function index to our one-dimensional, linear setting rather than the circular setting needed in industry agglomeration. The results using the L-function index are qualitatively similar, and generally stronger, than the estimates using the Herfindahl index.
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Table 7 - Placement of High-Usage Plans, Incumbents' and Entrants' 1998 Pricing Plans: FIML
Estimation

Share of plans Normalized Herfindahl Normalized Herfindahl
above median above median below median

Standard Standard Standard
Coefficient error Coefficient error Coefficient error

Provider and plan characteristics

Prov.Analog 0.468*** 0.087 0.099 0.171 -0.265* 0.202

Prov.Mixed 0.206*** 0.055 -0.082 0.129 -0.353** 0.189

Plans_Digital 0.377*** 0.055 -0.173* 0.117 -0.408** 0.209

Entrant_YN -0.195*** 0.025 -0.075* 0.051 0.598*** 0.131
Market structure

Prov.Analog x Competitors -0.013 0.015 -0.140*** 0.028 0.008 0.036
Prov_Digital Competitors 0.017* 0.012 -0.042** 0.020 -0.095*** 0.030

Prov_Mixed x Plans. -0.025** 0.013 -0.088*** 0.025 0.042 0.044
Analog x Competitors
Prov.Mixed x Plans. -0.034** 0.013 -0.007 0.023 0.016 0.039
Digital x Competitors

Market characteristics

%withBA -0.005*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.003 0.003 0.003

Commuting time 0.003** 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.006** 0.004
Population 3.4E-04 0.001 6.5E-05 0.001 -0.001* 0.001

Household income 0.004** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 0.004 0.005

SD,7/y 0.143*** 0.004 0.321*** 0.009 0.431*** 0.024
Log-likelihood 87.10 -335.35 -474.19
Observations

521

504

488

Notes:
Provider
fixed-effects
i
tered
standard
errors
based
on
the
corresponding
bootstrap
st

ENTRANTS

=

0.

145

(0.0225) (0.0002) (0.0356) (0.0263) (0.0976)

POP

-

ADOPTION = 0.231 ENTRANTS - 0.038 BAPLUS + 0.027 COMMUTE + 0.048 POP + 0.031 INCOME
(0.1157) (0.0234) (0.0303) (0.0149) (0.0200)

+ 2.264 LARGE-SC +1.735 SMALL-SC + £D,
(0.4054) (0.4544)

for Specification II:

ENTRANTS =0.166 POP -0.002 POP2 + 0.061A/ŒA +0.1
(0.0308) (0.0003) (0.0558) (0.0403) (0.1090)

ADOPTION = 0. 161 ENTRANTS - 0.035 BAPLUS + 0.030 COMMUTE + 0.051 POP + 0.048 INCOME
(0.1966) (0.0264) (0.0454) (0.0266) (0.0229)

+ 2.788 LARGE-SC + 2.462 SMALL-SC + £D
(0.7410) (0.5434)

and for Specification III:

ENTRANTS = 0. 168 POP - 0.002 POP2 + 0.058 AREA + 0.08
(0.0257) (0.0003) (0.0719) (0.0415) (0.1150)

ADOPTION = 0. 157 ENTRANTS - 0.051 BAPLUS + 0.008 COMMUTE + 0.061 POP + 0.046 INCOME
(0.1442) (0.0185) (0.0267) (0.0180) (0.0158)

+ 2.419 LARGE-SC + 1.956 SMALL-SC + f.
(0.5509) (0.4995)

The variables are defined in Table 4. The estimated covariances {jd
-0.038, -0.036}, and {0.020, 0.103, -0.014} for Specifications I- III. T
{0.082, 0.098}, {0.049, 0.076}, and {0.024, 0.045} for Specifications I
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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their offerings to the customer group whose demand is best served
technology.

Entry also has a significant indirect effect on the share of high-usage plans.
For a mixed provider, the share of digital plans above the median is 58.34 percent
and for a digital-only provider 37.70 percent. This compares to 46.85 percent for
analog-only plan families. Therefore, transitioning to a mixed provider indirectly
increases the share of plans above the median while transitioning to a digital-only
provider decreases it.
We can also compare the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects for
a mixed-technology provider at the average level of entry. Entry directly decreases
the share of plans above the median by 5.45 percentage points for analog and by
7.38 percentage points for digital families. Incorporating the predicted probability
of adoption at the mean level of competition, the indirect effects decrease the share
of analog plans by 2.37 percentage points and increase the share of digital plans by
5.28 percentage points.19
Robustness. - To ensure that the plans targeting high-(low-)valuation consumers
are distinct, we also employ a Herfindahl index, normalizing it by the index if all
plans above (below) the median were equally spaced. For plans above the median,
we base the Herfindahl index on the spectrum of minutes from the allowance just
below the median (180 minutes) to the largest allowance within the plan family.
For example, consider a plan family with plans having allowances of 50, 100, 200,

and 500 minutes. There are two plans with above-median allowances and (500100) minutes, or 400 minutes, of allocable usage. The resulting Herfindahl index is

((500 - 200)/400)2 + ((200 - 100)/400)2 = 5/8. To normalize the Herfindahl

we divide by 1/2, the Herfindahl if the two plans above the median were equally
spaced, to obtain a normalized Herfindahl of 5/4. Theoretically, this measure ranges
from a minimum of 1 when high-usage plans are equally spaced, to n, when all n
high-usage plans are identical.20 In our data, it ranges from 1.00 to 3.02. Similarly,
for plans below the median we base the Herfindahl index on the spectrum of minutes
from zero to the allowance just above the median (180 minutes), which ranges from
1.00 to 5.15 in our data. The econometric specification is that given by equation (8),
using the normalized Herfindahl indeces for high and low usage plans in place of the
original measure for the full usage spectrum.
The results using the normalized Herfindahl above the median are shown in the
middle columns of Table 7. Entry has a negative and significant direct effect for all
plan family types except digital-only. Relative to the average normalized Herfindahl
above the median across all plan families (1.33), each additional competitor reduces
the normalized Herfindahl by 3.14 to 10.59 percent, depending on the plan family
and provider type. The indirect effect of competition is negative but not economically
significant. We thus find that high-usage plans are more distinct with more entry.

19 A similar calculation for transition to a digital-only provider yields a direct increase of 3.78 and an expected
indirect increase of 3.41 percentage points.
20The Herfindahl in the numerator is undefined when there are no high- (low-) usage plans. This accounts for
the seventeen (thirty-three) observations we lose when using these measures.
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The results for the normalized HHI below the median

columns of Table 7. Entry has a negative and significant d

plan families. Each additional competitor reduces the
5.56 percent of the normalized Herfindahl below the m

(1.71). The direct effects for other plan types are not sign

of competition are statistically significant but econom

predicted probability of adoption at the mean level of ent

the normalized Herfindahl below the median by 1.97 p
percent for digital-only providers, and 0.23 percent f

percentage of the average normalized Herfindahl belo
find that low-usage plans are more distinct with more

ers and slightly more distinct with more entry for mixed

D. Effect on Price Levels

Since competition significantly alters the nonlinear
firms this raises the question of how price levels are
different consumers. We follow the approach of B
to assess the effect of competition on quantity discou
measuring the response in price-cost ratios to changes
in our setting, the marginal cost of providing service
customers does not vary with competition. Overall, w
tion results in greater price reductions for high-usage

Econometric Model - BR suggest testing whether th
changes with the number of competitors. We follow th
log price charged by provider i for q¿ minutes of service

(9) HPijmt) = <*imt+ ßimtln(<lj) + £ijm»
where a imt captures differences in cost or demand levels across providers and markets and /?/w,the curvature of the price schedule. A value of one for ßimt corresponds

to linear pricing, ßimt< 1 to quantity discounting, and ßimt> 1 to quantity premia.

To estimate equation (9), we construct a grid of usage levels in ten-minute increments. For each plan family, we compute the minimum total price at each grid point
across all calling plans in the family, thus constructing the lower envelope of prices.

The underlying assumption, as in Miravete and Roller (2004), is that consumers
choose the optimal plan for their usage. We bound the usage grid at 1,000 minutes.
Individual-level usage data for 1999 and 2000 obtained from TNS Telecoms indicate a usage level of 985 minutes for the 99th percentile of consumers. Since our data

cover an earlier period, a cutoff of 1,000 minutes represents a reasonable estimate
for maximum usage. Our results are robust to using a 2,000-minute cutoff.

21 In related work, McManus (2007) provides empirical evidence for the "no distortion at the top" prediction of
theoretical models of nonlinear pricing.

VOL 3 NO. 2 SEIM AND VIARD: THE EFFECT OF MARKET STRUCTURE 243

Table 8 - Distribution of Estimated Curvature of Incumbents' and
Entrants' 1998 Pricing Schedules

Analog plans, Digital plans,

incumbents incumbents Entrants

Mean

SD

0.627

0.093

0.444

0.109

0.486

0.099

Min

0.402

0.167

0.197

Max

0.920

0.837

0.844

Percentiles:

5 percent 0.465
25 percent 0.560
50 percent 0.640
75 percent 0.689
95 percent 0.774

0.260 0.282
0.404 0.438
0.432 0.483
0.492 0.552
0.653 0.616

Average adjusted R2 0.946 0.872 0.903
Observations

We use a
and ß for
equation

mates

178

128

215

two-stage proced
every technology

(9)

for

for

a

each

and

ß

plan

f

based

o

families

exhibit quantity di
counting than analog. In th
mated curvature of the pri

(10)

Betaimt
+

=

ac

+

ßC(Prov_Techim)(P

EE/^./ř.zy
We
(5),

ßcxPr

+

*£

augment equation (10)
in a system-of-equation

Direct

and

Indirect

Effects.

-

plan variety for high-usage
directly increases analog p

schedule that has a much g
ing schedule. Firms transit

22 Our estimation of the second stag
deviation of the residuals of each pl
observations. The FGLS procedure doe
upper-bound estimates of competitio
range

23

of

We

utes

of

responses

verified

usage

to

that

for

all

entry

prices

plan

from

fall

qua

overal

families

in

Prices fall with entry, although not all
for endogeneity of entry and to using
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Table 9 - Curvature of Incumbents' and Entrants'
1998 Pricing Schedules: FIML Estimation
Standard

Coefficient error

Provider and plan characteristics

Prov_Analog
Prov_Mixed

Plans_Digital

-0.076*

0.032

-0.230**

Entrant_YN

Market

0.057

-0.167**
0.001

0.033

0.028

structure

Prov_Analog x Competitors -0.026** 0.011
Prov_Digital x Competitors -0.022** 0.010
Prov_Mixed x Plans_Analog x Competitors 0.003 0.011
Prov_Mixed x Plans_Digital x Competitors 0.011 0.011
Market characteristics
%

with

BA

-0.002*

0.001

Commuting time 0.003** 0.002
Population -3.5E-04 0.000

Household

SD,
Fixed

income

rfurv
effects

0.003**

0.087**
Provider

Log-likelihood

0.001

0.037

level

339.41

Observations

521

Notes:
Provider
fixed-ef
clustered
standard
error
tions,
with
the
correspon

ENTRANTS

=

(0.0330) (0.0003) (0.0783) (0.0523) (0.1610)

0.

169

ADOPTION = 0. 127 ENTRANTS - 0.044 BAPLUS - 0.050 COMMUTE + 0.063 POP
(0.1849) (0.0265) (0.0418) (0.0276)

+ 0.056 INCOME +235SLARGE-SC + 1.86
(0.0209) (0.3594) (0.4659)

The variables are defined in the footnote to Table 4. The est

{0.008, 0.062, -0.016}. The estimated variances {оЪ,(т2р} a
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
♦Significant at the 10 percent level.

discounting, especially analog- and digital-o

market decreases the curvature of the nonl

only providers and 0.02 for digital-only pr
of 0.63 and 0.48, respectively. Competition
quantity discounting. Transitioning from
the curvature of the digital pricing sched
provider.
III. Conclusion

Firms in communications and information services industries usually market
products using nonlinear pricing plans and frequently introduce new generati

services. How market structure affects these interdependent choices is assessed by
relevant but distinct strands of literature: one focused on market structure's effect o
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product diffusion and another on its effect on second-degree price disc

empirically estimate market structure's joint effect on adoption and pr

their relative effects. We examine the effect of entry on firms' pricing

context of new technology diffusion. Our setting allows us to control f
determinants of both the market structure and the behaviors of intere

nomically significant effects of market structure on both adoption and

Our results are consistent with lower concentration speeding up t

tion and stimulating marketing of the technology. Incumbents in m

competitors are more likely to transition from analog to digital transm

gies. This is consistent with cellular incumbents anticipating that sig

digital competitors would largely eliminate the market for analog se

tive exceeded that of waiting until the cost of deploying the technology

Lower concentration is also associated with firms marketing the

more aggressively by offering more plans and spreading their pla
across the usage spectrum. This is consistent with firms' increased
the calling plan space" and steal customers when facing a larger set
Prices decline most for high- volume customers.
Our results on the interaction between firms' pricing strategies
adoption suggest the need for a more detailed analysis of the effe
adoption on subscribers' usage choices and therefore consumer we
would also allow a more detailed analysis of competition's effect o
pricing plans available to different customer types and therefore
ment of the effect of plan variety.
Appendix

A. Adoption Model

In this Appendix, we derive conditions that determine an incumbent's technology
adoption decision in the face of entry by n competitors who have pre-committed
to adopting a new technology.24 We tailor a subgame of the Fudenberg and Tiróle
(henceforth FT) (1986) model to analyze whether an incumbent chooses to adopt at
a time tu before the entrants' pre-committed adoption time t2, or to adopt only after
entry at a time ¿3, continuing to use the pre-existing technology in the meantime.25

We apply the model to information and communications services industries, such
as cellular services, which share the following characteristics. First, competition in
these industries can be regarded as differentiated Bertrand since output can be changed

easily once capacity is set and marginal costs are nearly zero in the absence of capacity constraints. Second, most innovations in these industries are product rather than

24 In addition to being unable to deter entry, the incumbents' ability to delay entry in our setting is also limited
since the FCC required PCS license holders to meet specific coverage requirements within a five-year time window
to maintain their licenses.

5 As in FT, we derive the equilibrium for a single incumbent to simplify the exposition. We can extend their
setup to two incumbents and n pre-committed entrants, allowing the incumbents to pre-empt each other strategically
in their adoption timing of a cost-reducing innovation. We have chosen not to do so here to focus attention on the
incumbent's reaction to entry.
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process innovations since marginal production costs are near

industries, post-entry profits under the old technology
affected by entry than those under the new technology

these assumptions, we find that the incumbent's propen

increases in the number of entrants, at least when faced wi

If the incumbent adopts at time t before entry, the net p
profits is:
nt

nt2

ЛОО

(Al)
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Simplifying,
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26
Although
the
digital
technolog
agement,
such
cost
reductions
are

innovation reduces costs.
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The incumbent adopts prior to entry when V{ - V3 > 0. We ca
how the number of entrants, n, affects the incumbent's adoption

ber of entrants affects only the incumbent's flow profits after en

turn, Ц adjusts according to equation (A4). Changes in the number

whether the incumbent adopts before or after the entrants, depending

v

¿(v, - v3) _ le-- ^Unf-nS)
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where e о is the elasticity of demand
is the elasticity of demand for the i
cross-price elasticity of demand bet
old-technology revenues, and /tevf i

27 Note that the remaining terms in the derivati
chooses its post-entry adoption timing optimally.

28 If the incumbent adopts the digital technolog
information and communications services, the new
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Therefore, the incumbent is (weakly) more likely to ad
its post-entry demand for new-technology service exce
the demand for old-technology service. Adoption occur
price for new-technology service is more sensitive to th
the price for old-technology service or the demand for
is more sensitive to the number of entrants than deman

service. Finally, the incumbent is (weakly) more likely to
its revenues from new-technology exceed those from old
two services are not close substitutes.

In information and communications services industries, there are a number of
reasons why post-entry profits under the old technology are likely more adversely
affected by entry than those under the new technology. In these industries, revenues from new services tend to quickly exceed those of previous technologies.
As discussed in Section II, the number of subscribers to digital quickly overtook

those to analog service, suggesting that analog-service demand declined significantly in the presence of even a few entrants. New entrants usually offer the latest

technology, as they did in cellular services, suggesting that the price of the new
service is more sensitive to the number of entrants than the price of the old service.
Lastly, the elasticity of the incumbents' residual demand elasticity for the new
service is likely greater than its residual demand elasticity on the old service, at
least if it faces significant entry. In cellular services incumbents faced on average
2.16 entrants.
B. Estimation Procedure

Our system-of-equation results rely on full information maximum likelihood estimators that maximize the likelihood:

(A9) L=Y[Lm.
m='

In estimating the system of equations with the number of plan introductions as
dependent variable, the contribution to the likelihood from market m is:

(AIO) Lm = Pr(Entrantsm = j,Digitalim = kh APlans imt = //řV/,ř),

where j is an index of the number of entrants, k¿ equals one if firm i e {1,2, ...

implements the digital technology and zero otherwise, and lit indexes the change in t

number of plans in firm /'s plan family for technology t G {analog, digital}. This equ

(All) Pr(Cf - f < el < Cf+l - fE,tfm < (2*, - l)/f,

Cl-Â<iL< C{+ì -tf, Ví.ř),
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where Cf is the cutoff f 017 entrants and Cp is the cutoff for a change o
of plans offered. This probability is given by the integral of the 3/ + 1

normal distribution of f £,, ^pimt, and eEm with mean zero and var

matrix given by (I is the identity matrix and S is a matrix of all on

аТУ^1х1 + I/x/ ^DP^lxli ^Dfl/xl

(A12) E = ^DP^lIxì crpS2/x2/ + I2/X2/ aPE^2Ix' >
aDE^'xI aPE^'x2I 1»
■

■
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cu
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Th

an
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(Al3)Lm=' Jcf-fE
J J-00
[ Ч gpt(ep)U(eD^eE)deDdepdeE,
J
Jcf-fEJ-00
J-00IJ-00
/=1 lítali
[ Ч te{A,D}
J
where

(A14) g?(eD) = Ф(/Р + eD)'l - *(f? + e*))1-*
*Î(O = Ф(СЬг -К- e") - *(CÍ - fi - e"),
and ф(е°, ep, eE) refers to the pdf of the divariate normal distribution of (eD, ep, eE)
in equation (7). We further integrate e^ out of the likelihood, conditioning on e^ and
epm to obtain:

(A15) Lm = J j-00j-00J j-00
j-00 /=1
П LL'g?(eD)
-;e{A)D}-;e{A)D}
'i
П iS(O

x [Ф^,4С^ -ñ - *WÁcf -п}Ф(ео,ер)ае°аер,
where Ф^^^ denotes the conditional cdf of sE, given realizations of eD and ep.

29 This results from stacking the / adoption errors £?m, the 2/ technology-specific plan-change errors f £,, and the
single market-level error eEm. The dimensionality of the plan change errors is less than 2/ in the data since not all
firms offer both analog and digital plan families in all markets.
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For the continuous plan variety measures, the likelih

technology adoption and plan variety choices across pla

becomes (where vit equals the observed variety measure
technology t):

(A16) Pr(Entrantsm = j,Digitalim = kh Variety >ш

= Pr(C/ -f<eEm< Cf+l - f' tf, < (Ib -

This entails only one modification of gft(sp) above, wh
normal pdf of r]fmt:

(A17) gf^ď) = fa - ff, - e").

For a given value of the parameters, we use simulation techniques to com

market's contribution to the likelihood in equation (A 15) by integrating n
over the bivariate normal distribution of eD and eř. We then use a numer

mization routine to maximize the full likelihood in equation (A9) and up
parameters until convergence.

We assess parameter significance using bootstrap samples of 50 rep

We control for non-random clustering of unobservables by firm. For each

sample, we draw firms from the set in our sample and include the full s
families each firm offers across its market. We add firms until the number of obser-

vations is at least as large as the number of observations in the actual dataset and
the bootstrap sample contains at least one observation for each level of the discrete
variables.
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